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                <datestamp>2019-09-01T11:41:29Z</datestamp>
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                    <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en">THE POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS OF AGENCY PROBLEMS IN FIRMS: THE CHALLENGES OF BUSINESS MANAGEMENT</dim:field>
                    <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2019</dim:field>
                    <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://ezaposleni.singidunum.ac.rs/rest/sciNaucniRezultati/oai/record/1/7295</dim:field>
                    <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" authority="orcid::0000-0002-1989-0504" confidence="-1">Krstić, B.</dim:field>
                    <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" authority="id:28543" confidence="-1">Petković, M.</dim:field>
                    <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" authority="id:28544" confidence="-1">Rađenović, T.</dim:field>
                    <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract">Abstract: Agency theory deals with the potential problems which may arise when principals delegate their tasks and responsibilities to the agents. Agency problems arise due to the informational asymmetry that exists between principals and agents in firms. Namely, the goals that agents pursue might be quite different from the goals of the principals, while the principals cannot fully monitor the performance of the agents. This puts a great challenges to the business management in a competitive modern environment. Therefore, the aim of the paper is to point out the agency problems in firms and to offer potential solutions in the form of compensation policy and controlling mechanisms.
Keywords: agency theory, agency problems, compensation policy, controlling mechanisms</dim:field>
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                    <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="source">50th International Scientific Conference CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC TRENDS: TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND  CHALLENGES OF COMPETITIVENESS</dim:field>
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